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Chapter 4 
Textures of Thought: Theatricality, Performativity, and the Extended/Enactive Debate 
Teemu Paavolainen  
While relatively recent, the ‘cognitive turn’ in theatre and performance studies has engaged a 
growing community of scholars who are now looking to the sciences of the mind for no less 
than a paradigm shift.1 Whether or not this promise is delivered, the enterprise would benefit 
from further reflection on its underlying assumptions and ideologies. In this chapter, I wish to 
engage the very interface of the two fields by targeting four contested concepts in their cur-
rent discourses: specifically, by interweaving extended and enactive notions of mind with the 
well-worn humanistic idioms of theatricality and performativity. While all four defy clear-cut 
definition, they all promote generally world-involving philosophies of sense and identity, and 
do indeed appear to share some core assumptions. In particular, I will argue that certain val-
orisations of the former bear considerable discursive affinities with the latter – the extended 
with the theatrical, the enactive with the performative – and that these family resemblances 
may help articulate blind spots on both fronts. Rather than reduce either pair to the other, let 
alone explain either away, my aim is to discuss them as aspects of wider ‘cognitive ecolo-
gies’2: while both cognitive and theatre studies have witnessed a shift from representations 
and pregiven identities to a focus on embodied action and performance, ecology here names a 
parallel (potential) extension beyond individual brains or actors to wider textures of thought. 
By way of a very short introduction, the ‘extended’ and ‘enactive’ idioms3 specify al-
ternative dynamics as to how precisely it is that cognition, as they say, is ‘embodied and en-
1 At least since the landmark anthology Performance and Cognition: Theatre Studies and the Cognitive Turn, 
eds Bruce McConachie and F. Elizabeth Hart (New York: Routledge, 2006), the approach has become a con-
stant presence in the field’s major conferences and foremost journals. Since 2008, Palgrave Macmillan have 
published the series Cognitive Studies in Literature and Performance, in which a number of studies have to date 
addressed not only general historical and theoretical concerns, but also the very pragmatics of acting, spectator-
ship, and cultural performance. 
2 Edwin Hutchins, ‘Cognitive Ecology,’ Topics in Cognitive Science 2, no. 4 (2010), 705–15; see also James J. 
Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1986, first published 
1979); Teemu Paavolainen, ‘From Props to Affordances: An Ecological Approach to Theatrical Objects,’ Thea-
tre Symposium 18 (2010), 116–34. 
3 See Richard Menary, ed., The Extended Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010); John Stewart, Olivier 
Gapenne and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, eds, Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2010). 
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vironmentally embedded.’ Drawing on widely divergent disciplines, from biology to robotics, 
both approaches portray mind as an ongoing process interweaving body, brain, and the larger 
environment, its ‘correlates’ being thus fundamentally ecological rather than exclusively neu-
ral or intracranial. (It should be noted that this shift from strictly internal to more external 
ontologies of mind reflects a long-held tension in acting practice and training, between the 
simplified positions of acting from the inside-out or from the outside-in.) Rather than favour 
one over the other, I maintain that the theories of enaction and extension may fruitfully befit 
different discussions, but also that they articulate a stronger form of cognitive contexture than 
do the more neutrally local/global variants of embodiment and its environmental embedding – 
indeed, rather than conflate these approaches into one church, we would better remain sensi-
tive to implicit conflicts in how they configure the roles of action and perception, agent(s) 
and environment(s).4 However, it can be argued that all four strands of ‘4E cognition’ be-
speak a fundamentally ecological ontology: why restrict cognition only to its neural ‘back-
stage’ in some inner ‘theatre of the mind,’ when effectively all the world’s a stage for the 
embodied/embedded/extended processes of enaction in which it is performed?  
Here we are already in the time-honoured domain of the theatrical metaphor, differently 
configured in different aesthetic, academic, and everyday contexts. Crucially, neither theatri-
cality nor performativity need be restricted to their cognate art forms: in cognitive-ecological 
terms, to recapitulate, I specifically intend them as intertwining practices or qualities of mak-
ing sense, identity, and meaning. Metaphorically, both concepts have been applied to discuss 
more abstract phenomena of social and cultural existence, yet both also remain abstract 
enough to depend on even more basic metaphors themselves, according to the context and 
purpose of their varying definitions. While their etymologies would suggest a vague distinc-
tion between seeing and doing – from the Greek theâsthai, ‘to behold,’ and the Old French 
parfornir, ‘to do, carry out, finish, accomplish’ – both discourses also fluctuate between con-
flicting values of novelty and normativity: in the case of theatricality, between the essence of 
 
4 See especially Julian Kiverstein and Andy Clark, ‘Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One 
Church or Many?’ Topoi 28, no. 1 (2009), 1–7; also Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede, eds, The Cambridge 
Handbook of Situated Cognition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Michael Wheeler, ‘Minds, 
Things and Materiality,’ The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind, eds Lambros 
Malafouris and Colin Renfrew (Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs, 2010), 29–37; and my brief 
account in Teemu Paavolainen, Theatre/Ecology/Cognition: Theorizing Performer-Object Interaction in 
Grotowski, Kantor, and Meyerhold (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 43–52. Read superficially and 
against the grain, it could even be argued that the E-words themselves carry all the trappings of containment and 
dualism, whether between agent and environment or event and context: where embodied mind neglects the 
world for the body, enaction even imposes biological closure; extension implies some central operative to be 
extended, and embedding entails two entities where one is embedded within the other. 
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an art form and a more evasive cultural quality itself regarded in the affirmative or in the pe-
jorative (hence the ‘anti-theatrical prejudice’); in the case of performativity, between doing 
and its dissimulation – the heroic extraversion of Performance Studies and the docile incorpo-
ration of social discipline as per Judith Butler. However, the reciprocity of perception and 
action that notions of cognitive ecology invariably postulate would suggest that we need to 
understand this set of tensions as fundamentally interdependent to begin with. 
Not that the E-words themselves are any news to cognitive theatre and performance 
scholarship. On the more enactive front, John Lutterbie has developed a ‘general theory of 
acting’ explicitly informed by dynamic systems theory, while Phillip Zarrilli has applied Alva 
Noë’s sensorimotor version to actor training, not from the ‘outside’ position of ‘representa-
tional or mimetic theories of acting,’ but rather ‘from the perspective of the actor as enac-
tor/doer from ‘inside’ the act of performing.’5 On the ‘extended’ side, Evelyn Tribble has 
studied the historical practices and environments of Renaissance theatre ‘at a range of levels’ 
distributed across an ‘uneven triad of insides, objects, and people’ – internal mechanisms, 
material conditions, and social structures – while I myself have drawn on aspects of both dis-
courses in a study of three emblematic scenographies of the historical avant-garde.6 The 
strengths and shortcomings of this work aside,7 the brief examples I present in this chapter 
are not drawn from the world of theatre as much as they are from well-known (if indeed 
somewhat theatrical) experiments in the cognitive sciences, highlighting the themes of 
change, attention, and appearance that also recur in my reflections on performativity and the-
atricality. Applied to such admittedly abstract qualities, theories of cognitive ecology allow 
us to be rather more specific as to how ‘the world’s a stage’ for our collective (cognitive) 
performances; conversely, these more humanistic idioms may provide historical depth to 
strictly cognitive conceptions of meaning, sense, and identity, bringing to the fore neglected 




5 John Lutterbie, Toward a General Theory of Acting: Cognitive Science and Performance (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2011); Phillip B. Zarrilli, ‘Introduction,’ Acting: Psychophysical Phenomenon and Process, 
eds Phillip. B. Zarrilli, Jerri Daboo and Rebecca Loukes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1–50: 18. See 
also Alva Noë, Action in Perception (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). 
6 Evelyn B. Tribble, Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare’s Theatre (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 2, 7; Paavolainen, Theatre/Ecology/Cognition. 
7 In line with the above discussion, I am thinking of blurred distinctions and ‘churches’ conflated, yet the appro-
priate level of abstraction and precision can only be settled according to each specific context. 
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Bringing Forth: Magnitudes of Enaction 
To the extent that the actual truth value of my concepts can be bracketed for their rhetorical 
aspirations, a convenient place to begin charting the territory is performance theorist Richard 
Schechner’s work on the ‘magnitudes of performance,’ organised by size, duration, exten-
sion, and degree of consciousness. Positing ‘theatricality’ as a special case of a more restrict-
ed range (as I will too) Schecher presents ‘performativity’ as a general condition that ‘perme-
ates all seven magnitudes’ from brain event to macrodrama, its broad spectrum virtually co-
extensive with life itself.8 By comparison, even if the ‘deep continuity’ of the enactive ap-
proach – as theorised by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Ezequiel Di Paolo, and others9 – 
is between life and mind, not life and performance, its rhetoric does appear closely akin to 
Schechner’s. Indeed the tone can even be conceived of as imperial: where the ‘enactive’ now 
boasts a transdisciplinary perspective ‘on an extremely diverse variety of phenomena … oth-
erwise separated by disciplinary discontinuities’ – ‘all the way from [the single] cell to socie-
ty and back again,’ as Froese and Di Paolo put it in a recent ambitious overview10 – so would 
(Schechnerian) Performance Studies, initially at least, challenge the very status of Theatre 
Studies in Anglo-American academia.11 Even as their key concepts differ markedly, both 
fields claim the ability to analyze all magnitudes of living existence, be it as a dynamic of 
play and ritual from animal behaviour to public politics, or as one of ‘autonomy’ and ‘emer-
gence’ from single-cell organisms to encompassing ecosystems. 
Turning from Schechner to the philosopher and critical theorist Judith Butler, however, 
the one key premise on which the concepts of enaction and performativity also converge ex-
plicitly is in renouncing pregiven essences for acts of ‘bringing forth’ – no longer in the busi-
ness of just expressing or revealing pre-existing worlds, minds, or identities, but precisely 
enacting, performing, or indeed constituting them from moment to moment. Certainly, there 
is a difference in nuance and domain with regard to just what constitutes such ‘constitution’: 
In the classical phenomenological sense of the enactive paradigm, the term refers to the 
 
8 Richard Schechner, ‘Magnitudes of Performance,’ Performance Theory, rev. and expanded edn (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 290–332. All seven magnitudes would include: (1) brain event; (2) microbit; (3) bit; (4) sign; 
(5) scene; (6) drama; and (7) macrodrama (meaning ‘large-scale social actions … where whole communities act 
through their collective crises,’ p. 326). 
9 As distinct from the ‘sensorimotor’ version most associated with Alva Noë (Action in Perception; but cf. Alva 
Noë, Out of Our Heads: Why You Are Not Your Brain, and Other Lessons from the Biology of Consciousness 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2009)). 
10 Tom Froese and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, ‘The Enactive Approach: Theoretical Sketches from Cell to Society,’ 
Pragmatics & Cognition 19, no. 1 (2011), 1–36: 2–3. 
11 Richard Schechner, Performance Studies: An Introduction, 2nd edn (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
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world’s disclosure to awareness in acts of intentional consciousness.12 In Butler’s more so-
cially active sense, the performativity of gender ‘means, quite simply, that it is real only to 
the extent that it is performed’; instead of our ‘doings’ (styles, clothes, gestures) merely exte-
riorising what we essentially ‘are,’ they ‘effectively constitute the identity they are said to 
express or reveal’ in the social sphere.13 However, neither tradition grounds ‘thought’ in iden-
tity or ontology. For Varela and colleagues, cognition is ‘the enactment of a world and a 
mind’ on the basis of a history of their ‘structural coupling’14; in Thompson’s neat set of 
equations, it is this ‘co-emergence’ of self and world that amounts to ‘sense-making, which 
[again] equals enaction.’15 Situating performativity ‘within a wider movement against Des-
cartes’ cogito,’ sociologist Vikki Bell, likewise, sees its key argument as one for coextensivity 
over ‘any originary notion of interiority.’16 Crucially, if one of the key challenges she has 
identified is for performativity to account for the creativity and self-organisation of matter, 
beyond the narrowly ‘psychic’ or cultural,17 this is certainly something an enactive perspec-
tive could deliver. Below, I draft aspects of such an intertwining ‘from cell to society.’ 
Consider first the ur-performance of the enactive approach: that of the living cell as a 
paradigm of an ‘autonomous system.’ As Thompson explains, the ‘recursive interdepend-
ence’ of its ‘constituent processes’ takes the form of ‘a self-producing, metabolic network’ 
that constitutes it as an autopoietic ‘unity in the biochemical domain and [also] determines a 
domain of possible interactions with the environment.’18 Thus if performative identity in 
Bell’s phrasing is neither ‘essential, ontological [nor] inevitable,’ but only has constancy due 
to a fragile ‘reiteration of connections,’19 then on the enactive view it depends on precisely 
the kind of self-organisation she calls for, in a delicate dynamic of autonomy and emergence. 
Whereas ‘autonomy’ sets enaction apart from other approaches to embodiment, ‘emergence’ 
accounts for its broad spectrum of ‘non-reducible domains … typically associated with quali-
 
12  Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 15. 
13 Judith Butler, ‘Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theo-
ry,’ Theatre Journal 40, no. 4 (1988), 519–31: 527–8. 
14 Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human 
Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 9, 205. 
15 Thompson, Mind in Life, 158. 
16 Vikki Bell, Culture and Performance: The Challenge of Ethics, Politics and Feminist Theory (New York: 
Berg, 2007), 11. 
17 Bell, Culture and Performance, 97–8, 114. 
18 Thompson, Mind in Life, 44. 
19 Bell, Culture and Performance, 32, 36. 
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tative shifts in experience.’ On the one hand – and I keep paraphrasing Froese and Di Paolo – 
even if a nervous system ‘can enable the emergence of a domain of behavior and cognition,’ 
the latter cannot be reduced to the former; likewise, ‘the social domain cannot be reduced to 
the behavior of the individuals’ of which it is a large-scale emergent.20 On the other hand, as 
Thompson and Stapleton note, ‘even the simplest organisms regulate their interactions with 
the world’ so as to transform it ‘into a place of salience, meaning, and value – into an envi-
ronment (Umwelt) in the proper biological sense of the term.’21 Whatever the magnitude, 
Thompson elaborates, we witness here the co-emergence of ‘selfhood and a correlative world 
or environment of otherness’: ‘Whereas autopoietic closure brings forth a minimal “bodily 
self” at the level of cellular metabolism, sensorimotor closure produces a “sensorimotor self” 
at the level of perception and action.’22 
Hence an important distinction should be made between constitutional and relational 
domains, with ‘sense-making’ as the relational or interactional side of autonomy. Keeping 
with Thompson, the distinction is between the ‘system as such’ and its ‘performance or be-
havior in its structural coupling with the environment,’ definitionally in place ‘when the con-
duct of each is a function of the conduct of the other.’23 As Di Paolo puts it, reiterating per-
haps the ultimate precondition of performativity, ‘what an organism is and what it does 
should not be properties external to each other.’24 On the enactive view, however, couplings 
also come in emergent orders or magnitudes, from the merest symmetrical influence to the 
more ‘asymmetrical’ concepts of behaviour, action, and adaptive agency that also entail the 
regulation of lower-order couplings. Accordingly, cognition as such is defined as ‘the regu-
lated sensorimotor coupling between a cognitive agent and its environment, where the regula-
tion is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself’25: it is ‘not an event happening inside the sys-
tem … [but] the relational process of sense-making that takes place between the system and 
its environment’26 – or in a well-known phrase, ‘the enactment or bringing forth of a world 
by a viable history of structural coupling.’27  
 
20 Froese and Di Paolo, ‘The Enactive Approach,’ 3. 
21 Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton, ‘Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended 
Mind Theories,’ Topoi 28, no. 1 (2009), 23–30: 25. 
22 Thompson, Mind in Life, 48–9. 
23 Thompson, Mind in Life, 50–1, 45. 
24 Ezequiel Di Paolo, ‘Extended Life,’ Topoi 28, no. 1 (2009), 9–21: 18. 
25 Froese and Di Paolo, ‘The Enactive Approach,’ 18.    
26 Thompson and Stapleton, ‘Making Sense of Sense-Making,’ 26. 
27 Varela, Thompson and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, 205. 
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Arguably, however, a performative dynamic is well in place before the emergence of 
any cognitive domain. What I mean is exemplified by Thelen and Smith’s dynamic-systems 
experiments in infant development, in which they found that a ‘reflex stepping action seen to 
disappear at about two months can be restored by holding the baby upright in water.’ That the 
otherwise non-stepping baby will step under water shows that the reflex itself, assumedly 
lost, is ‘clearly in place even while other factors (such as leg mass) prevent its expression 
under ecologically normal conditions.’ With little agency or stepping-relevant cognition on 
the infant’s part, that is, the capacity that here emerges is courtesy of the temporary performa-
tive system composed of baby, adult, and bathtub.28 
Now, the really relevant question here concerns how the two sets of concepts navigate 
their native paradoxes of novelty and normativity (in the above example, the stepping reflex 
and the ecological affordances to support its emergence). In a sense, this is the paradox of 
performativity, driven between what Jon McKenzie calls its ‘subversive’ and ‘normative va-
lences’: the kind of cultural agency cherished in Performance Studies – the Austinian vision 
of doing things effectively – and the more Butlerian rendering of social performativity as an 
ongoing ‘reiteration of norms.’29 Arguably, an enactive emphasis on autonomous systems 
‘whose being is their own doing’30 might provide the Butlerian idiom with a more positive 
account of embodied agency, without compromising its grounding in reiteration.  
Indeed, what enables the comparison is how both discourses abound in figures of circu-
larity to account for change and invariance. Where notions of performativity range from 
Schechner’s ‘restored behaviour’31 to Butlerian citationality and Derridean iterability – some-
times overly textual in their metaphysics – those of enaction capitalise on biological cycles of 
coupling and closure. In Thompson’s recap, ‘organizational closure refers to the self-
referential (circular and recursive) network of relations that defines the system as a unity, and 
operational closure to the reentrant and recurrent dynamics of such a system’; in such opera-
 
28 Esther Thelen and Linda B. Smith, A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of Cognition and 
Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); I quote the precis in Andy Clark, ‘Embodied, Situated, and 
Distributed Cognition,’ A Companion to Cognitive Science, ed. William Bechtel and George Graham (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1998), 506–17: 506–7. 
29 Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance (New York: Routledge, 2001), 15; J. L. 
Austin, How to Do Things With Words, ed. J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986); Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (London: Routledge, 1993), 234. 
30 This very performative phrase from Hans Jonas (‘Biological Foundations of Individuality,’ International 
Philosophical Quarterly, 8 (1968), 231–251: 233) is often quoted in enactive circles, notably in Renaud 
Barbaras’s contribution in Enaction, eds Stewart, Gapenne and Di Paolo, 89–122: 93, 119, 121. 
31 See for example Schechner, Performance Studies, 34–6. 
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tional terms, ‘cognitive structures and processes emerge from recurrent sensorimotor patterns 
of perception and action.’32 However, where Butler’s fairly weak concept of agency consists 
in the possibility of repeating differently and thus exposing wider textures of iterability, the 
enactive concept of agency refers to a more active, asymmetric modulation of more local 
couplings, without ‘positing either the individual or the interactive levels as fundamental.’33 
As Varela et al poetically put it, ‘We are always constrained by the path we have laid down, 
but there is no ultimate ground to prescribe the steps that we take.’34 
Finally, some potentially fruitful discrepancies might also be found by comparing how 
the two approaches conceive of normativity and precariousness. If performativity for Butler 
‘consists in a reiteration of norms which precede, constrain, and exceed … the performer’s 
“will” or “choice”’35 and perhaps make her very life precarious, the inherent normativity of 
an enactive system is precisely a measure of its own flourishing as it ‘actively generates and 
sustains its identity under precarious conditions.’36 Admittedly, Froese and Di Paolo have 
lately engaged in intriguing theoretical work to extend enactive principles to the social do-
main, ‘taking on an autonomous organization’ of its own while guided by a normativity 
‘highly underdetermined by metabolic values.’ In short, they present ‘the heteronomy of cul-
ture’ as yet ‘another discontinuity in the system of discontinuities which constitutes life, 
mind, and sociality.’37 Arguably, however, the enactive approach still lacks the tools for 
properly engaging the more top-down processes of the political, mirroring perhaps the bot-
tom-up influence of biological autonomy and of the ‘cognitive unconscious’ that Thompson 
contends ‘cannot be made experientially accessible.’38  
Hence the more performatively oriented questions of how the apparently ‘natural’ or 
‘pregiven’ may work to occlude, conceal, or ‘dissimulate’ its enactive/performative constitu-
tion; and how subjects may ‘actively partake in their own subjection,’ sustained as they are 
by lines of power and knowledge which they themselves recursively sustain and  ‘literally 
incorporate,’ yet which they must also deny in order to assert themselves as subjects.39 Alt-
 
32 Thompson, Mind in Life, 45, 13. 
33 Ezequiel Di Paolo and Evan Thompson, ‘The Enactive Approach,’ The Routledge Handbook of Embodied 
Cognition, ed. Lawrence Shapiro (London: Routledge, 2014), 68–78: 75. 
34 Varela, Thompson and Rosch, The Embodied Mind, 214. 
35 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 234. 
36 Thompson and Stapleton, ‘Making Sense of Sense-Making,’ 24. 
37 Froese and Di Paolo, ‘The Enactive Approach,’ 5, 17, 28. 
38 Thompson, Mind in Life, 12. 
39 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 12; Bell, Culture and Performance, 14, 17. 
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hough formally implicit in its systemic implications – of local interactions enacting global 
patterns and being thereby constrained – the ‘cell-to-society’ theorists themselves admit that 
the layer of culture ‘is still in much need of further clarification by the enactive approach.’40 
 
Standing In: Extension and Its Discontents 
Thus, it can be argued, we have already entered the prop room whence ideas of extended 
cognition take off. Predicated on a public domain between the magnitudes of brains and cul-
tures, indeed on humble materials habitually denied the kinds of agency we feel befit both 
brain and culture, one of this approach’s central arguments is for the constitutive ‘role’ of 
‘nonbiological props’ in the cognitive ‘drama’ or ‘ensemble’ – and it is no accident that phi-
losopher Andy Clark leans on resolutely theatrical language here.41 In the theoretical drama 
that ensues (perhaps around the merest performances of pen and paper) the stakes are clear: 
where his opponents would reduce such props to mere causal background – as ‘accidental 
extras’ to ‘basic biologically given minds’42 – for Clark the very idea that mind and self only 
unfold ‘on some privileged stage marked out by the good old-fashioned skin-bag’ amounts to 
a ‘biochauvinistic prejudice.’43 And indeed, one way of determining what the extended might 
share with the theatrical lies in their being variously embraced and rejected in just such dra-
mas of value. Around since Western antiquity, what Jonas Barish famously dubbed the ‘an-
titheatrical prejudice’ is still evident in the ‘hostile or belittling’ connotations that the theatre 
begets in everyday language (playing up to, putting on an act, making a scene).44 As noted, 
the word’s etymology first evokes sight and spectatorship; add a Platonic prejudice over 
‘mere appearances,’ and it becomes a pejorative term for something derived if not detri-
mental to art and society alike, defined, as Thomas Postlewait and Tracy C. Davis neatly put 
it, by its ‘excess and its emptiness, its surplus as well as its lack.’ Be it the technology of 
stagecraft or extensions of cognition, whatever is opposed is deemed ‘deceptive, exaggerated, 
artificial, or affected,’ secondary to and corruptive of some prior essence – effectively ob-
 
40 Froese and Di Paolo, ‘The Enactive Approach,’ 4, caption to Figure 1. 
41 Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 6, 75–7, 139; see also his ‘Author’s Response,’ Metascience 13, no. 2 (2004), 
169–81: 176 (‘cognitive drama’); and my Theatre/Ecology/Cognition, 46–9. 
42 The words are a proponent’s: John Sutton, ‘Material Agency, Skills and History: Distributed Cognition and 
the Archaeology of Memory,’ Material Agency: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Approach, eds Carl Knappett 
and Lambros Malafouris (New York: Springer, 2008), 37–56: 37. 
43 Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, 27; Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 77. 
44 Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 1. 
Accepted manuscript. Please cite the published version in The Cognitive Humanities: Embodied Mind 




structing ideals of aesthetic absorption and enactive immersion alike.45 Whether theatricality 
serves to occlude reality, authenticity, literature, or liveness, the expressive promiscuity of 
cognitive extension risks contaminating what critics like Adams and Aizawa call the very 
‘mark’ or specificity of cognition itself.46 
As was implied by their few applications to theatre and performance studies, then, there 
is a sense in which the enactive and the extended bet their stakes on the actor and the scenery, 
respectively (the experiential first person and the spectatorial third). Where the enactive de-
rives ‘mind’ from the specifics of biological embodiment, the extended ‘depicts the body as 
just one element in a kind of equal-partners dance.’47 Indeed, the multiple realisability of 
such extended functionalism comes close to that of theatricality precisely. Just as humans 
need not be depicted by humans, nor darkness by darkness, on stage – as Jindřich Honzl put it 
in 1940, ‘the theatrical sign … can use different materials for its implementation’48 – so also 
the ‘functional networks’ of cognitive extension may casually disregard the particulars in 
which they are realised.49 In other words, what matters is their functional role and mechanical 
interaction rather than their physical constitution. As Mark Rowlands puts it, ‘if it walks like 
a duck, and talks like a duck, then it is a duck’ – how and where ‘is not directly relevant.’50  
For Clark, the machinery of mind is quite specifically ‘just tools all the way down’: if 
only ‘poised for easy use and deployment as and when required,’ any piece of external scaf-
folding may support cognitive properties beyond those of the bare agent – think again with 
pen and paper, or the artist’s sketch pad – making her constitutively heteronomous (‘other-
governed’) in a way that the enactive principle of autonomy will not allow.51 Nor, finally, can 
 
45 Thomas Postlewait and Tracy C. Davis, ‘Theatricality: An Introduction,’ Theatricality, eds Tracy C. Davis 
and Thomas Postlewait (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1–39: 4, 5. They further relate the 
philosophical dichotomy of ‘appearance and reality’ to an entertaining ‘series of related antinomies …: real ver-
sus false, genuine versus fake, intrinsic versus extrinsic, original versus imitative, true versus counterfeit, honest 
versus dishonest, sincere versus devious, accurate versus distorted, revealed versus disguised, face versus mask, 
serious versus playful, and essential versus artificial. All things theatrical are on the negative end of the polari-
ty.’ (17) See also Marvin Carlson, ‘The Resistance to Theatricality,’ SubStance 31, no. 2–3 (2002), 238–50. 
46 Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, ‘The Bounds of Cognition,’ Philosophical Psychology 14, no. 1 (2001), 43–
64. 
47 Kiverstein and Clark, ‘Introduction,’ 2. 
48 Jindřich Honzl, ‘Dynamics of the Sign in the Theater,’ Semiotics of Art: Prague School Contributions, eds 
Ladislav Matejka and Irwin R. Titunik (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976), 74–93: 88. First published 1940. 
49  Robert A. Wilson and Andy Clark, ‘How to Situate Cognition: Letting Nature Take Its Course,’ The 
Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, eds Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 55–77: 69. 
50 Mark Rowlands, ‘Enactivism and the Extended Mind,’ Topoi 28, no. 1 (2009), 53–62: 56–7. 
51 Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, 136, 141; Thompson and Stapleton, ‘Making Sense of Sense-Making,’ 27–8; 
see also Thompson, Mind in Life, 43. 
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either mind or theatre claim any immutable set of constitutive elements if even the most 
prominent (like the performing body) are easily coupled and decoupled on the shortest notice. 
Where Bert States defines the very history of theatre ‘as a progressive colonization of the real 
world,’ incorporating ‘almost anything into its diet,’ Clark would deem us all ‘natural-born 
cyborgs’ already primed ‘to create, co-opt, annex, and exploit nonbiological props and scaf-
foldings’ as ‘part and parcel’ of extended minds ‘distributed across brain, body, and world.’52 
Flipping metaphors, the cognitive theatre has become not only considerably extended 
here, but also indifferent (in good avant-garde tradition) to the walls of the playhouse. Re-
place ‘the mind’ with ‘theatre’ in the opening sentence of Clark and Chalmers’s 1998 inaugu-
ration of ‘The Extended Mind,’ and the implications threaten our very stand on reality: 
‘Where does the [theatre] stop and the rest of the world begin?’53 Here it may be illuminating 
to briefly recount three stories of how the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ stages of this distributed drama 
have previously been set up. The first concerns Clark and Chalmers’s own parity principle 
for determining when cognitive extension takes place: ‘If … a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part 
of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive pro-
cess.’54 To the standard objections of confusing coupling with constitution and derived with 
intrinsic content – Otto’s notebook with Inga’s biological memory, in the article – the stand-
ard reply of the extended functionalist is that rather than ‘the outer performing just like the 
(human-specific) inner,’ what matters is its contribution to the system’s ‘functional poise’ 
such that its removal might deteriorate performance.55  
The second story is Edwin Hutchins’s, casting the early internalism of cognitive sci-
ence as an over-reaction to behaviourist principles, and ‘mistaking the properties of a com-
plex sociocultural system for the properties of individual minds’ – here, projecting the logi-
cian’s actual manipulation of symbols with ‘her hands and eyes’ into a principle of inner 
 
52 Bert O. States, Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theater (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985), 36, 39; Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, 6, 31, 32–3. 
53 Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, ‘The Extended Mind,’ Analysis 58, no. 1 (1998), 7–19: 7. The article is 
reprinted in Clark, Supersizing the Mind, 220–32, and Menary, The Extended Mind, 27–42. 
54 To be precise, I am here citing Clark (Supersizing the Mind, 77) purporting to cite Clark and Chalmers (‘The 
Extended Mind,’ 8) yet incorporating a delicate set of adjustments in agency, truth value, and scope: ‘Were it 
done’ becomes ‘were it to go on’; ‘recognizing’ becomes ‘accepting’; ‘(so we claim)’ becomes ‘(for that time).’ 
55 Wilson and Clark, ‘How to Situate Cognition,’ 72; Kiverstein and Clark, ‘Introduction,’ 3–4. Thus, for Clark 
and Chalmers, ‘the notebook plays for [the impaired] Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga’: ‘It is 
central to his actions in all sorts of contexts, … reliably there when needed, available to consciousness and 
available to guide action, in just the way that we expect a belief to be’ (‘The Extended Mind,’ 13). 
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computation.56 The third story is then Clark’s externalist reversal of the cognitivist one: ‘In-
stead of attempting to create, maintain, and update a rich inner representation’ of a scene, the 
‘opportunistic’ visual brain rather ‘deploys a strategy that roboticist Rodney Brooks describes 
[in Clark’s favorite quote] as “letting the world serve as its own best model.”’57 
Then again, cognitive extensions come in a wide variety of forms only some of which 
appear intuitively theatrical. In the ‘two-dimensional matrix’ that Wilson and Clark propose, 
the augmentative resources may be ‘natural, technological, or socio-cultural in nature,’ the 
resulting wholes either ‘one-off, repeated, or relatively permanent.’ At one extreme, extended 
mind simply ‘scores rather more highly on the … dimension of durability and reliability,’ 
showing ‘cognitive capacities that seem qualitatively distinctive’.58 Examples range from 
cultural institutions in general – carrying out cognitive processes that could not possibly just 
‘go on in the head’ – to early modern theatre in particular, as ‘an object lesson in the power 
and scope of distributed and situated cognition.’59  
At another extreme are such more weakly coupled, transient, and less iterative systems 
that I will deem particularly theatrical, ‘exposing [for Wilson and Clark] a barely connected 
hodge-podge of warring materials … apt for rapid dissolution or replacement.’60 In Clark’s 
intriguing terms, these systems typically enact ‘surrogate situations,’ standing in for what we 
could hardly grasp otherwise, yet precisely available for direct coupling and manipulation: 
with no world yet present to serve as its own best model, we ‘let a real, physical model serve 
as its own best world.’ Insofar as ‘the need for [such] situational surrogacy increases with the 
sensory ineffability’ of what one is trying to fathom, it is well evidenced in ‘the sheer wealth 
of material culture’ associated with religion, science, or indeed the theatre, trading the 
ephemeral for the kinds of ‘online’ cognition that we are intuitively good at according to 
connectionist doctrine: recognising patterns, modeling simple dynamics, manipulating ob-
jects.61 In fact, I am inclined to also include in this ‘ephemeral’ category the recessive nature 
 
56 Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 371–2, 355, 361. 
57 Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, 68. 
58 Wilson and Clark, ‘How to Situate Cognition,’ 62, 74; 66–7. 
59 Shaun Gallagher and Anthony Crisafi, ‘Mental Institutions,’ Topoi 28, no. 1 (2009), 45–51: 47; Clark, Super-
sizing the Mind, 64. Clark acknowledges Tribble’s work directly; in extending the discussion to institutions, 
Gallagher and Crisafi startlingly find it ‘difficult to think of a form of cognition that is not extended in some 
sense. The exceptions may be our dreams and the other small bits of cognition that go on in our heads’ (p. 51). 
60 Wilson and Clark, ‘How to Situate Cognition,’ 58. 
61 Andy Clark, ‘Material Surrogacy and the Supernatural: Reflections on the Role of Artefacts in ‘Off-line’ 
Cognition,’ The Cognitive Life of Things: Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind, eds Lambros Malafouris and 
Colin Renfrew (Cambridge: McDonald Institute Monographs, 2010), 23–28: 24–5. Evoking e.g. mock-ups, 
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of enactive cognition (the path walked down), presupposed by the extended mise-en-mind as 
its makeshift components stand in for the brought-forth. Staples of the theatrical, political 
estrangement and melodramatic excess alike can only reference norms already enacted or 
performed in the world, now made explicit in antagonism and stereotype. 
And here we have inconspicuously shifted camps, from the anti- to the pro-theatrical, 
reflecting the ‘major reversal’ in its appreciation that Postlewait and Davis situate in aesthetic 
modernism – not least with the historical emergence of the professional theatre director, now 
‘making a virtue of the mimetic gap’ previously held so suspect.62 In Marvin Carlson’s af-
firmative prose, this is a view of theatricality not ‘as a pale, inadequate, or artificially abstract 
copy of the life process’ but ‘as a heightened celebration of that process and its possibilities.’ 
Moreover, such a view may proudly ‘admit to all those qualities that have historically been 
cited against it – that it is artificial, removed from everyday life, exaggerated, extreme, flam-
boyant, distracting.’63  
Insofar as there are three central threads to Christopher Balme’s admirably succinct 
definition of such theatricality as ‘a mode of perception that brackets moments of action or 
particular places in such a way that they are imbued with extreme concentration and focus,’64 
each can also be helpfully woven into the surrogate-situation definition as well. First, the 
formalistic notion of theatricality as the work of framing or foregrounding, and hence of 
bracketing its ‘poetic function’ from the domain of effective action, works fairly straightfor-
wardly with the distinction between pragmatic and epistemic action – what Rowlands dis-
sects into ‘the manipulation, exploitation and transformation of environmental structures’ 
precisely in respect of their cognitive affordances.65 Second, if indeed theatricality is a per-
ceptual modality, then its very function (applying Clark’s cognitive definition) is to ‘render 
certain features of our world concrete and salient’ so that we may ‘target our thoughts … on 
 
sketches, storyboards, and statues, Clark’s latest iterations of this idea draw on Henrik Gedenryd’s work on 
design (Supersizing the Mind, 155), and Matthew Day’s on religion (‘Material Surrogacy,’ 24–5). 
62 Postlewait and Davis, ‘Theatricality,’ 12, 14. See also Teemu Paavolainen, ‘Woven Within: Textures of 
Theatricality and the Directorial Impulse,’ in the sixth yearbook of the Theatre Research Society in Finland, 
forthcoming online at <http://teats.fi/julkaisut.html>. 
63 Carlson, ‘The Resistance to Theatricality,’ 244, 246, 249. 
64 Christopher B. Balme, Pacific Performances: Theatricality and Cross-Cultural Encounter in the South Seas 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 6, my italics; the idea of theatricality as a mode of perception is de-
rived from Elizabeth Burns, Theatricality: A Study of Convention in the Theatre and in Social Life (London: 
Longman, 1972). With implications forward and back in the present discussion, the definition continues: ‘It 
invariably emphasizes the visual senses and moves the beholder to become aware of his/her act of spectating. 
Because this mode of perception depends on the recognition of pre-existing patterns and conventions, it is often 
framed or, pejoratively spoken, marred by a sense of second-handedness’ (Balme, Pacific Performances, 6). 
65 Rowlands, ‘Enactivism and the Extended Mind,’ 53. 
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elements of a scene that were previously too “unmarked”’ (incidentally, the title of Peggy 
Phelan’s influential book on performativity).66 As for this sense of focus, finally, surrogate 
situations provide a theatrical ‘halfway house between fully offline’ thought and the more 
time-constrained, densely-coupled performances of everyday life, by the dual means of tem-
poral relaxation and selective concretisation – that is, latitude in timing and the abstraction or 
idealisation of content by omitting the extraneous. As any financially-pressured theatre com-
pany will know, ‘commitment to maximal detail and realism … may prove counter-
productive.’67 
Finally, theatrical effects also abound precisely when epistemic action is inhibited. If in 
the previous examples they enabled an absent ‘target situation’ to be cognised with percep-
tion and action still tightly coupled, in others the target may appear there before us while a 
sense of theatricality begins with the decoupling of action from perception (without yet being 
institutionalised into divisions of actors and audiences). In some cases the effect is still af-
firmative, affording insight into patterns of change otherwise occluded by their very time-
scale or other forms of performative normalisation. As a theatricalisation of the earlier baby-
steps example, consider Gunnar Johansson’s canonical studies of biological motion, being 
recognised as such through the merest set of reflective markers attached to an actor’s joints, 
the instant they begin to move about in the dark. (Reflecting the principles of both puppetry 
and motion-capture technology, the technique was arguably inspired by the Czech tradition of 
‘black light theatre.’)68 In other instances, even dramatic changes may go all unnoticed if 
only they do not ‘violate the gist of the scene.’ Such was the case in Simons and Levin’s 
‘slapstick scenario’ on a university campus, where most unsuspecting testees failed to notice 
that the person who just asked them for directions, briefly occluded from view by a door car-
ried by, was swiftly substituted with another quite unlike in both build and attire.69  
 
66 Andy Clark, Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 172; Peggy Phelan, Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 
1993). 
67 Clark, ‘Material Surrogacy and the Supernatural,’ 25–6. In his earliest discussion of surrogate situations as 
their ‘own best microworld,’ Clark presents the ‘halfway house’ they are to provide as specifically ‘evolutionary 
and developmental’ (Andy Clark, ‘Beyond the Flesh: Some Lessons from a Mole Cricket,’ Artificial Life 11, no. 
1–2 (2005), 233–44: 237–8). 
68 Gunnar Johansson, ‘Visual Perception of Biological Motion and a Model for Its Analysis,’ Perception and 
Psychophysics 14, no. 2 (1973), 201–11. For demonstration, see 
 <http://www.biomotionlab.ca/Demos/BMLwalker.html> [accessed 24 September 2015]. 
69 Daniel J. Simons and Daniel T. Levin. ‘Review: Change blindness,’ Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1, no. 7 
(1997), 261–267: 266; see also Clark, Natural-Born Cybogs, 66. As Alva Noë observes, ‘artists, magicians, 
stage designers, and cinematographers – people who live by the maxim that the hand is quicker than the eye – 
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This is all in agreement with the tropes of distance, duality, and detachment apropos of 
theatricality, defamiliarising the performative by operations of decoupling and decontextuali-
sation, yet only deemed ‘theatrical’ in degrees – from the merest ‘outside’ perspective of the 
novice to a sense of excess and contrivance as such ‘cuts’ abound. (As Simons and Levin 
note, age was also a factor in their experiment, with peers less easily fooled than older partic-
ipants just encoding ‘some student asking directions.’70) With its vexed dynamic of insight 
and illusion, however, now intuitive and now inhibiting, any ‘logic’ of theatricality can only 
ever appear as one of principled disparity: if taken by a scene which, were it to unfold in a 
theatre, we would scarcely act upon, its theatrical affordances may (or may not) affect our 
thought and action nonetheless. 
 
Cognitive Ecology: Textures of Thought? 
So in a sense we are back at the question of magnitude, regarding the cultural and biological 
conceptions of cognitive ecology that the notions of extension and enaction appear to imply. 
In terms of how they specify the very relationship between agents and environments, their 
core commitments are effectively to functional heteronomy and systemic autonomy, multiple 
realisability and ‘compositional plasticity’ – by which Thompson and Stapleton mean ‘the 
body’s capacity to incorporate environmental processes into the operationally closed network 
… that constitutes its autonomy.’ This is neatly clarified by the dual terms they borrow from 
Helena De Preester. If cognitive extension occurs when a set of heterogeneous resources is 
instrumentally recruited to Clark’s ‘ecological assembly,’71 on the spot, then enactive incor-
poration only occurs when such resources are no longer experienced as objects but ‘function 
transparently in the body’s sense-making interactions with the environment.’ Further, if ex-
tensions are ‘artifacts that we use and control in order to extend our abilities,’ then ‘tools that 
the body incorporates … have a phenomenologically different status’ – hence the parallel 
requirements for transparency and functional poise (as the extended-mind variant) if any-
thing extra-bodily is to count as part of a cognitive system.72  
 
would not be surprised by the change blindness results’ (Action in Perception, 59). Indeed, one possible avenue 
for the cognitive study of theatricality could be that opened by the cognitive study of magic and ‘the effects 
created by magicians’ – specifically ‘the ability to control attention, to distort perception, and to influence 
choice’ (Gustav Kuhn, Alym A. Amlani and Ronald A. Rensink, ‘Review: Towards a Science of Magic,’ 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12, no. 9 (2008), 349–54: 349). 
70 Simons and Levin, ‘Review,’ 266. 
71 See Clark, Supersizing the Mind, 13. 
72 Thompson and Stapleton, ‘Making Sense of Sense-Making,’ 28–9. 
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In regard to the enactive and extended camps’ respective affinities with the phenome-
nology of consciousness and with more mechanically unconscious operations, the upshot for 
the present discussion is a view of performativity as the unconscious of the enactive and of 
theatricality as a consciousness of situated extensions. If the notion of performativity signals 
the emergence of an identity – one that ‘literally incorporates the lines of force and 
knowledge that surround it’73 – and thus also needs to be actively enacted and sustained, then 
that of theatricality is more apt for makeshift appearances in the fleeting situation, easily de-
composed as ‘tools all the way down,’74 only assembled in improvisational practices as and 
when required. 
More poetically perhaps, I am inclined to suggest that the key metaphors of mind here 
involved span the magnitudes of metabolism, manipulation, and movement. On the one hand, 
in a Lakoff-and-Johnson-style cognitive linguistic account,75 enactive thinking thus figures as 
bodily movement between topics, straight or in cycles, overcoming obstacles, and sometimes 
forced to conclusions. In the extended scenario, meanwhile, thoughts become objects to play 
with/toss around/turn over, are only examined aspectually and may (at moments of slapstick) 
slip from our grip altogether. On the other hand, performative processes of movement and 
metabolism are simply more tightly coupled with the environment than are more theatrical 
instants of vision and precision – even if only so with the Gibsonian medium (the ever-
ambient air or water) through which organisms are bound to move in action and perception.76  
By implication, if the paradigm examples of enaction range from autopoietic closure, as 
chemically realised by the single cell, to the grand metaphor of ‘laying down a path in walk-
ing,’77 these crucially occur on magnitudes that habitually recede from consciousness and 
actively dissimulate their performative constitution. By contrast, if cognitive extension is 
typically achieved through acts of bodily manipulation – perhaps of surrogate situations that 
actively suppress realistic detail and relax temporal constraints – it is specifically set to make 
things more ‘graspable’ on an ecologically human scale. Somewhat akin to Schechner’s ‘the-
atrical’ magnitudes of bit, sign, and scene, since fit for further editing once ‘freed from their 
 
73 Bell, Culture and Performance, 17 (my emphasis). 
74 Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs, 136. 
75 On such metaphors of mind, see especially George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The 
Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 235–43. 
76 See Gibson, The Ecological Approach, 16–19. 
77 Thompson, Mind in Life, 44, 13. 
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attachment to larger schemes of action,’78 this is the scale of direct perception and action, 
targeting what would otherwise remain too vague or unmarked, affording feats of cognitive 
compression and selective (in)attention. Moreover, this very sense of manipulation also moti-
vates an antitheatrical bias against excess theatrics in the business of maliciously manipulat-
ing their pliable audiences. 
Even if only an evocative list of words, these notions of movement, metabolism, and 
manipulation do begin to suggest how the ephemeral excesses of theatricality may profitably 
parasitise the more enduring ecologies of performative evolution. If we intend metaphor not 
as mere figures of speech – theatrical in the sense of embellishing or reflecting some pre-
existing reality – but instead as deeply performative in the sense of creating the very textures 
of thought we take to be real, then the very possibility of change lay in attending to what our 
metaphors serve to hide or highlight, instead of merely reiterating those we are accustomed to 
live and act by.79 As notions of mind as ‘extended’ or ‘enactive’ are ultimately metaphorical, 
in themselves, the final move I would like to propose is that the different strands of action, 
perception, and ecology discussed might be productively interwoven by the more general 
dramaturgical metaphor of texture.80  
In such terms, if ‘cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context,’81 
we should conceive of ‘context’ not on the image of concentric containment, but in terms of 
the fluid intertwining of its divergent layers or strands, that is to say, not in terms of ready-
made entities, merely ‘embedded’ in readymade contexts, but in terms of ongoing processes 
constitutively interwoven with their ongoing contextures – evolutionarily, historically, devel-
opmentally, here-and-now. Whatever the life form or the art form, the range of its meaning is 
that of its weaving, going on and leaking beyond, the ‘mind’ being a process continuously 
 
78 Schechner, ‘Magnitudes of Performance,’ 321. 
79 Cf. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
80 My thinking here is specifically influenced by the ‘contextualism’ of the largely forgotten pragmatist philos-
opher Stephen C. Pepper, esp. in his World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence (Berkeley, CA: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1942); and by the anthropologist Tim Ingold, for example his Being Alive: Essays on Movement, 
Knowledge and Description (London: Routledge, 2011). To my knowledge, Diane Gillespie’s The Mind’s We: 
Contextualism in Cognitive Psychology (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992) remains the sole 
book-length application of Pepper’s metaphors to cognitive studies. More specifically, see Teemu Paavolainen, 
‘Meaning in the Weaving: Mapping and Texture as Figures of Spatiality and Eventness,’ Nordic Theatre Studies 
27, no. 2 (2015). 
81 Hutchins, ‘Cognitive Ecology,’ 705. 
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interweaving body, brain, and world, rather than an object that one could neatly localise in 
some privileged part of its ongoing texture.82  
So let me try to recap how my target concepts appear, as textures of thought within 
wider cognitive ecologies. If performative textures are typically enacted over time and de-
pend on further histories of sensorimotor experience, then more theatrical ones may recruit 
external scaffolding opportunistically assembled on the fly, relativising the role of embodied 
agency by drawing on whatever strands of context are available, cutting some and compress-
ing others. If one moment of such cognitive texture is deemed performative by cycles of con-
tinuity and change (from circular causation to restored behaviour) it is the deviant density or 
sparsity of another that frames or qualifies it as theatrical – yet both only emerge in the 
weave of absorption and attention, immersion and intervention. That both terms still have 
analytical purchase is due to a key qualitative difference in their magnitude: where the per-
formative tends to evade consciousness, the theatrical is precisely intuited as such and may 
indeed heighten our sensitivity to its performative constitution.83 If the paradox of performa-
tivity consists in its naming the eventness of apparent objects and essences while simultane-
ously dissimulating it, then that of theatricality consists in rendering this eventness percepti-
ble precisely by reducing it to manageable objects – by collapsing, into synoptic space, some 
texture of trajectories interwoven over performative time. Apart from my attempts in this 
article, evidence to the effect of these specific idioms weaving into one another in roughly 
these ways is provided by the previous work that has systematically drawn on versions of the 
enactive, in discussing specifically embodied practices of performing,84 and on the extended, 
for more distributed kinds of theatrical dynamics.85 
 
 
82 Even if its ‘bouts of seepage’ seem inconsistent with the mechanistic premises of extended functionalism, 
they are in agreement with recurrent metaphors in Andy Clark’s prose: For instance, the ‘loosely knit field’ of 
embodied cognition depicts thought and reason as ‘looping through’ and ‘inextricably … intermingled’ with 
‘the details of our gross bodily form, our habits of action and intervention, and the enabling web of social, cul-
tural and technological scaffolding in which we live, move, learn and think’ (Clark, ‘Material Surrogacy,’ 23; 
Wilson and Clark, ‘How to Situate Cognition,’ 74). In an important recent review article, Edwin Hutchins has 
taken issue with whether that which ‘spins, selects, or maintains the webs of cognitive scaffolding’ (Clark, Su-
persizing the Mind, 123; but see also notes 18 and 19 on p. 243) need be the ‘biological human organism’ or 
could equally include the crucial ‘orchestration’ provided by ‘cultural practices’ (Edwin Hutchins, ‘Enculturat-
ing the Supersized Mind,’ Philosophical Studies 152, no. 3 (2011), 437–46).  
83 Cf. Erika Fischer-Lichte, ‘From Theatre to Theatricality – How to Construct Reality,’ Theatre Research 
International 20, no. 2 (1995), 97–105, arguing on proto-enactive grounds that theatricality is ‘not restricted to 
theatre … yet is explicitly focused and marked by it’ (p. 103), and that ‘by reflecting theatricality, the spectators 
reflect on the conditions underlying and guiding the process by which they construct reality’ (p. 104). 
84 Lutterbie, Toward a General Theory of Acting; Zarrilli, ‘Introduction.’ 
85 Tribble, Cognition in the Globe; Paavolainen, Theatre/Ecology/Cognition. 
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